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A burgeoning literature examines how to mitigate hold-up problems. Less attention has been
paid, however, to why some ￿rms deliberately expose themselves to hold up. That after all is the
consequence of exclusive-dealing contracts so frequently adopted when legal. In this paper we try
to explain the use of such arrangements to sharpen incentives in a world of incomplete contracts.
Exclusive-dealing contracts have been usually considered by courts and antitrust commentators
as part of the menu of vertical restraints such as exclusive territories and resale price maintenance.
For instance, Marvel (1982) de￿nes exclusive dealing as ￿a contractual requirement by which
retailers or distributors promise a supplier that they will not handle the goods of competing
producers￿. But more broadly, any clause that explicitly prohibits one of the contracting parties
from dealing with non-contracting counterparts can be considered as intrinsically exclusive. Hence,
exclusivity is also applicable to situations in which a manufacturer of an (intermediate) input
promises a potential downstream buyer not to trade the input with competing buyers, and this
case represents the leading example of this paper.1
Some early papers have claimed (rather informally) that exclusive-dealing contracts may en-
hance incentives to make speci￿c investments, because they curb certain free-rider problems and
hence provide safeguards against ex post opportunism. This body of literature has focused on sit-
uations in which an agent￿s investment exhibits external or cross-eﬀects, in the sense that it aﬀects
the potential revenue a trading partner can generate when he or she deals with other parties. Mar-
vel (1982) argues for example that exclusive contracts protect a manufacturer￿s investments (e.g.,
in promotional eﬀort) from the opportunistic behaviour of the dealers, who can opportunistically
switch their customers to more pro￿table brands once they are in the store. So, the argument
goes, in the absence of an exclusive relationship dealers may free ride on the manufacturer￿s eﬀort
and hence undermine the latter￿s incentives. A similar conjecture is given by Masten and Snyder
(1993), who argue that the system of exclusive leases used by United Shoe Machinery Co. in the
US was intended to foster United￿s investments that otherwise might have been pro￿tably used by
its customers in conjunction with competitors￿ equipment. Once again, the main argument is that
shoemakers had strong incentives to free ride on United￿s investments in nonpatentable innovations
and general know-how.
Other authors have argued instead, also informally, that exclusivity might foster relation-speci￿c
investments even in the absence of cross-eﬀects. A famous example is given by Klein, Crawford
and Alchian (1978). They study the vertical relationship between General Motors and Fisher Car
Body and conclude that the exclusive-dealing clause included in the trade agreement signed in
1919 between both parties was intended to encourage Fisher Body to make speci￿c investments in
production capacity, because it eliminated GM￿s threat to purchase bodies elsewhere after those
investments had been sunk.2 Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991) provide additional evidence along
these lines.3
1The case of a manufacturer signing an agreement to buy all its supplies from one of a number of upstream ￿rms
is analytically identical.
2Suppose that Fisher can sink investment of $95M to design a car body worth $200 to GM. Existing bodies
worth $100M to GM are available at a competitive price of $80M. The Fisher body thus creates gross surplus of
$180M but if the ex post bargaining splits the quasi-rent equally with GM it is not in Fisher￿s interest to invest.
Now suppose Fisher has an exclusive contract. In eﬀect it is as if the competitive alternative does not exist. Ex post
agreement with Fisher now creates a gross surplus of $200 which, if shared equally, makes it pro￿table for Fisher
to invest. The bene￿ts of marginal improvements in the design are though shared equally whether or not there is
an exclusive-dealing contract. So, on this perspective, exclusivity only has a role when there are indivisibilities in
investment.
3Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1975) and Hart (1995) also argue that the takeover of Fisher
1Of particular relevance to our analysis is Holmstr￿m and Roberts (1998), which examines
vertical structures that are closely related to our setup. To be more precise, they mention the case
of Nucor, an extremely successful American steel maker that decided to make David J. Joseph
Company its sole supplier of scrap. Holmstr￿m and Roberts then conclude that notwithstanding
potential hold-up problems, this vertical relationship based on an exclusive-dealing contract worked
satisfactorily for many years and actually stimulated a similar behaviour by Co. Steel in England,
which opted to rely on a sole supplier to make ready-to-use charges.
The particular setting we analyse involves an input monopolist dealing with two downstream
customers that use the input to produce ￿nal goods. These downstream ￿rms make relation-
speci￿c investments that (stochastically) increase the surplus they can generate when they are
allowed to use this input. To avoid inessential modelling complications, we assume throughout
that downstream buyers sell their goods in independent markets. In addition, the seller may
write ex ante an enforceable exclusive-dealing contract with one of the buyers that prohibits the
former from dealing with any ￿rm other than the exclusive-rightholder.4 An alternative way of
interpreting exclusivity in this context is to imagine that it speci￿es a prohibitive compensation
that the monopolist must pay to the exclusive buyer in case it trades the input with some other
￿r m .T h a ti s ,t h ep e n a l t yf o rb r e a c ho fc o n t r a c ti ss oh i g ht h a ti fi tm u s tb ep a i di tp r e c l u d e sa n y
possible trade between the seller and the nonexclusive buyer.
Following Segal and Whinston (2000), we assume that the exclusive contract can be renegotiated
as new information emerges so as to achieve ex post eﬃciency. We make use of their three-player
bargaining framework to model this process.
In a setup rather similar to theirs we discover, contrary to one of the main conclusions of
that paper, that in our model exclusivity matters even though noncontractible investments do
not exhibit cross-eﬀects or spillovers whatsoever.5 Moreover, our analysis suggests that exclusive-
dealing contracts are relevant for investment incentives whenever downstream ￿rms￿ payoﬀsa r e
responsive to internal values; that is, whenever a buyer￿s payoﬀ depends positively on its valuation of
the input even in realisations in which it is the lowest-valuing buyer.6 Hence, enforceable exclusive
trade agreements can encourage the protected ￿rm to make unveri￿able speci￿c investments even
absent the free-rider considerations that have been stressed in some of the previous literature.
This novel result stems from the fact that the exclusive contract has a negative impact on the
unprotected ￿rm￿s investment incentives, because under exclusivity this ￿rm has zero marginal
incentives to invest in the coalition in which it is only matched with the seller (from now on the
terms protected/unprotected, exclusive/nonexclusive and contracted/uncontracted will be used
indiscriminately to refer to the exclusive-rightholder and the other buyer respectively). As the
unprotected buyer invests less, the protected buyer expands (i.e., invests more in equilibrium)
because investments are strategic substitutes in this setup, and therefore exclusivity aﬀects the
by GM, completed by 1926, was to mitigate hold-up problems. This has recently been disputed by Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber (2000), Coase (2000) and Freeland (2000) who cite transaction cost savings and coordination
bene￿ts. The picture is mixed though. Coase reports that prior to 1926 many plants were owned by GM and leased
to Fisher. This suggests that hold-up may have been an issue. In addition, the merger was prompted by the concern
of GM that Fisher Brothers ￿...paid less attention to the needs of General Motors than General Motors would have
liked￿ (Coase, p.23). This indicates that the ownership change was designed to alter incentives.
4As pointed out by Hart and Tirole (1990), exclusive dealing may sometimes be unenforceable for either informa-
tional or legal reasons. In these cases vertical integration might be preferred to exclusivity. However, the analysis
of changes in ownership structures lies outside the scope of this paper.
5Recall that in this context investments exhibit cross-eﬀects when the surplus generated by the seller and one
of the downstream customers is sensitive to the investment level of the other buyer.
6It￿s worth mentioning that although this condition is not innocuous, it is satis￿ed for instance in many of the
standard cooperative bargaining solutions that have been previously used in the literature.
2equilibrium investment levels of both downstream buyers. This conclusion challenges some of
Segal and Whinston￿s ￿ndings. Indeed, the case of both buyers having investment opportunities,
although entirely reasonable, is not directly dealt with in Segal and Whinston￿s paper, which in
drawing conclusions focuses on situations in which only one party makes speci￿c investments.
We also ￿nd that under plausible circumstances exclusivity can be eﬃciency-enhancing and thus
represent a welfare improvement with respect to the benchmark nonexclusive solution. In other
words, our study indicates that in general exclusive-dealing regimes achieve second-best allocations
and are both privately and socially bene￿cial even when they result in complete foreclosure of the
unprotected buyer. This mechanism operates is a subtle way though, because the protected ￿rm
will typically be exposed to hold-up in equilibrium. However, when in the alternative nonexclusive
equilibria of the game we have that many buyers invest too little, a social planner might strictly
prefer allocations in which only one downstream customer invests at a reasonable high level to the
alternative less eﬃcient outcomes in which both customers invest at intermediate levels. As the only
equilibrium that may survive exclusivity is an asymmetric outcome in which only one customer is
active, e.g., invests at a high level, exclusive dealing may be considered as an eﬃciency-enhancing
device in many reasonable cases. We therefore provide a theoretical justi￿cation for real world
situations such as those mentioned by Holmstr￿m and Roberts (1998), which can be considered as
a source of puzzlement according to the existing literature on hold up problems.7
Rajan and Zingales (1998) is also related to our work. They conclude that when managers￿
investments are perfect substitutes, granting a single specialised manager access to an input essen-
tial for production is more eﬃcient than having two managers working together. Granting access
to a single agent is a form of exclusivity, so our conclusion is in some ways similar. The model
is though substantially diﬀerent. First, notice that even though access is also allocated ex ante,
the concept of ex post renegotiation is meaningless in Rajan and Zingales￿ context; their exclusive
contracting directly eliminates one of the managers from the ex post bargaining process. Within
a ￿rm it is often plausible that a manager must have contact with the ￿rm￿s assets to make pro-
ductive investments and access can be credibly denied. This is not so obvious though. When
trade is between ￿rms the assumption is less reasonable. Firms are often self contained production
units and there is no way a supplier of an input can hamper the technical productivity of a user￿s
investment.8 With this in mind, we follow Segal and Whinston (2000) in supposing that exclu-
sivity is a purely contractual arrangement that does not impinge in technical productivity. This
feature is a key ingredient of our framework, and we discover that in this context exclusive-dealing
relationships not only can replicate the equilibrium incentives provided by restricted access, but
a c h i e v em o r ee ﬃcient allocations when ￿rms￿ investments are imperfect substitutes. This point is
further illustrated in the next sections of the paper and other related issues are discussed in the
Conclusion. Secondly, in Rajan and Zingales￿ case of perfect substitutes, restricting access to a
single manager achieves always a second-best outcome because it avoids replication of investment
costs. We ￿nd to the contrary that when exclusivity matters for investment incentives the protected
￿rm ends up investing more whilst exclusive agreements cannot be characterised as unambiguous
eﬃciency-enhancing mechanisms.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 illustrates the main message of our
paper by means of an example. We discuss there some technicalities of our model and describe how
7In a rather diﬀerent setup, McAﬀe and Schwartz (1994) also ￿nd that in multilateral contexts exclusivity can
protect customers from ex post opportunism. However, their result depends delicately on the fact that downstream
￿rms produce substitute products (perfect or imperfect). We assume instead that these ￿rms don￿t compete on the
product market.
8This suggests a theory of the ￿rm; exclusive dealing is a step towards full integration. Our analysis isolates the
extra bene￿ts asset ownership makes possible.
3exclusive-dealing contracts can both foster noncontractible investments and achieve more eﬃcient
equilibria. We also analyse private incentives to create exclusive relationships. Section 3 presents a
more general and realistic framework. It establishes the potential existence of multiple Nash equi-
libria in our setup and characterises the benchmark nonexclusive and ￿rst-best outcomes. Then,
Section 4 studies the impact of an exclusive-dealing contract on downstream ￿rms￿ investment in-
centives and evaluates its potential implications in terms of aggregate welfare. A key Proposition,
identi￿ed as the ￿relevance result￿, points out under which particular circumstances exclusivity
matters in our model. This section also includes a brief analysis of exclusive clauses that stipulate
penalties for breach of contracts that con￿rms our previous results, and shows that full exclusivity
emerges as a special case of this general formulation. Finally, Section 5 highlights some conclusions.
2 Exclusivity in a simple setting
The purpose of this section is to convey the main messages of the paper in a relatively simple
setup; a richer theoretical model is subsequently analysed.
Let us assume that there exists a vertical relationship consisting of an upstream ￿rm, called U,
that produces a single unit of an indivisible input at (for simplicity) zero cost, and two downstream
￿rms denoted by D1 and D2. The intermediate input is transformed into ￿n a lg o o d sb yt h ed o w n -
stream ￿rms on a one-for-one basis at zero marginal cost, and for simplicity we also suppose that
￿nal goods are sold in independent markets. Put diﬀerently, D1 and D2 compete for the provision
of the essential input but do not compete on the product markets. All agents are risk-neutral.
The value that a downstream ￿rm generates when it is allowed to use the input is denoted
by Vj,j=1 ,2, and it depends stochastically on the level of noncontractible speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t
Ij. Both buyers are ex ante symmetric. In this simple example investments are discrete and
may be either IH or IL, where superscripts stand for ￿high￿ and ￿low￿ respectively. When a
￿rm doesn￿t invest at all its valuation is zero. In addition, investments can either succeed or fail
with probability 1
2, and to simplify the algebra we further assume that when both ￿rms invest they
cannot succeed simultaneously, i.e., successes are mutually exclusive events.9 So, think for example
that downstream ￿rms make investments in order to develop product innovations that increase
the value of their respective ￿nal products. These innovations though use diﬀerent technological
principles, maybe due to asymmetries in the physical nature of the ￿nal goods, and therefore once
the best technological trajectory is realised only one of the investments ends up being successful.
We assume nevertheless that a high investment level guarantees a minimal improvement in the
quality of the ￿nal product, in the sense that when a buyer invests at a high level it always
exhibits a positive valuation.
More formally, we assume that when a ￿rm invests IL its possible valuations are either V L if
the investment succeeds or 0 otherwise. In addition, when it invests IH t h ep o s s i b l eo u t c o m e sa r e
either V H if the investment succeeds or V L in case of failure. V H ≥ V L > 0, and the monetary
cost of investments are cH and cL,w i t hcH >c L > 0.
The sequence of events is exhibited in Figure 1. At date 1 both downstream ￿rms invest, then
the state of the world is revealed and afterwards the three parties bargain over the allocation of
the input and the price to be paid. Notice that the seller might write ex ante, at date 0, an
exclusive-dealing contract with one of the buyers, D1 say, giving this downstream ￿rm exclusive
rights over trade with U. We suppose that this contract is ￿incomplete￿ though, in the sense that
it cannot specify in advance a positive trade between these two parties, e.g., the nature of this
9The results do not require this extreme assumption.


























Figure 1: Sequence of events
trade is too complex to be speci￿ed in an enforceable contract. This exclusive relationship may
nevertheless be renegotiated after the state of the world is realised if it turns out that D2 is the
highest-valuing buyer and hence trading with D2 is eﬃcient. All relevant variables are observed
by the agents.
For illustrative purposes, we shall adopt here the Shapley value as the solution concept of
the three-player bargaining process. In fact, this solution emerges as a special case of the more
general framework discussed in the next section. Recall that the Shapley value of a player is
his expected contribution to all the possible coalitions he can join. So, let us denote by Ω =
[{U,D1},{U,D2},{D1,D 2},{U,D1,D 2}] the set of possible coalitions with at least two players
that can be formed in this game. We further assume that if the agents do not reach an agreement
on trade then all payoﬀs are zero.
Clearly, this simple model presents hold-up problems. However, we abstract from these consid-
erations for the moment in order to focus our attention on other implications of this example that
will resurface repeatedly throughout the paper. Since exclusivity is contractible, the upstream ￿rm
cares about ex ante eﬃciency. Therefore, we ￿rst restrict ourselves to the analysis of downstream
￿rms￿ investment incentives, and in the next subsection we shall investigate the seller￿s incentives
to sign an exclusive trade agreement.
We start by analysing the outcome in the absence of an exclusive-dealing contract. Letting ΠΩ
stand for the gross surplus achieved through an eﬃcient trade among the members of coalition Ω,

























for the upstream ￿rm, D1 and D2 respectively. It is worth explaining brie￿y how these payoﬀs
arise, because the more general bargaining solution considered in subsequent sections rests on
5analogous principles. As an illustration, consider investments (IH,IL). In this case, the possible
valuations are either (V H,0), when D1￿s investment succeeds and D2￿s fails, or (V L,VL) when
D1￿s investment fails and D2￿s succeeds. Each of these possible outcomes occurs with probability
1








































The same methodology may be used to derive downstream buyers￿ payoﬀs for the other possible
investment levels.
If U writes ex ante an exclusive-dealing contract with D1, the members of any possible coalition
may only agree to a positive trade if D1 is a member. In other words, ΠΩ =0whenever D1 / ∈ Ω.





















[ΠUD1D2 − ΠUD1] (6)
We proceed now to evaluate the eﬀects of exclusivity on investment incentives. As usual, a
downstream ￿rm￿s investment decision consists on choosing Ij,j=1 ,2, to maximise πj − c and
πe
j − c in the absence and in the presence of an exclusive-dealing contract respectively.
This simple investment game can generally give rise to multiple Nash equilibria (in pure-
strategy). To illustrate this point and make our case more clear, we focus throughout on situations
in which both the symmetric allocation (IL,IL) and the asymmetric allocations (IH,0)/(0,IH)
represent nonexclusive Nash equilibria of the game; Figure 2 provides the equilibrium constraints
for these two cases.
Clearly, these equilibrium con￿gurations will in general diﬀer in terms of total welfare. It might
well be the case that net aggregate surplus is maximised in the (asymmetric) allocations in which a
single buyer is active, i.e., invests at a high level. This is actually what happens when the additional
conditions V H+V L
2 >c H > V H−V L
2 and cH − 2cL < V H−V L
2 hold. Therefore, an exclusive-dealing
contract, if it aﬀects investment incentives at all, might have the desirable property of eliminating
less eﬃcient equilibria in which both buyers invest at low levels, thus enabling more bene￿cial
realisations to potentially emerge. For example, if the ￿rst-best outcome is achieved at investment
levels (IH,0) but the vertical structure can potentially be stuck in the ￿bad￿ equilibrium (IL,IL),
the existence of an exclusive trade agreement might aﬀect downstream ￿rms￿ investment incentives
in such a way that only the more eﬃcient allocation survives exclusivity. In these cases, exclusive
regimes achieve eﬃciency improvements with respect to the benchmark nonexclusive solutions. As
will be shown in subsequent sections, this simple and intuitive message of our paper transfers to
more sophisticated models.
To clinch the point we provide a numerical example. In particular, suppose that V H =1 5 ,
V L =1 2 ,c H =6 .2 and cL =2 .5.A s13.5 >c H > 1.5 and cH − 2cL =1 .2 < 1.5, the asymmetric
solution (IH,0) achieves the ￿rst-best outcome. Using the equilibrium constraints given in Figure
6Equilibrium constraints when there is 
an exclusive-dealing contract
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isn￿t an exclusive-dealing contract Potential Nash 
equilibrium
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Figure 2: Nash equilibria in a simple investment game
2, we may conclude that both (IL,IL) and (IH,0)/(0,IH) are nonexclusive equilibria of this game.
However, the ￿rst-best allocation (IH,0) is the only equilibrium that survives the creation of an
exclusive relationship between U and D1.10 This is due to the fact once we take exclusivity on
board, it is no longer pro￿table for the uncontracted buyer to invest IL, and the expansion of
the contracted buyer means the nonexclusive ￿rm ￿nds now pro￿table to directly stop investing.11
Therefore, an exclusive-dealing contract encourages the contracted ￿rm￿s speci￿c investments and,
at the same time, achieves the ￿rst-best outcome.
The achievement of the ￿rst-best allocation depends heavily on the assumed discreteness in
investment choices. What we want to emphasise is the more general result that exclusivity may
eliminate ineﬃcient equilibria in which too many ￿r m si n v e s tt o ol i t t l ew h e ni tw o u l db em o r e
eﬃcient if only one ￿rm invests at a reasonable high level. This is a desirable property of exclusive-
dealing contracts that is not recognised in the existing literature.
2.1 Private incentives to create exclusive trade agreements
The foregoing analysis implicitly assumes that if exclusivity augments aggregate surplus, it will be
adopted. Here it is made more precise why this is plausible.
We brie￿y analyse a simple mechanism by which the exclusive-dealing contract may be sold at
date 0 as well as the seller￿s incentives to enter into an exclusive trade agreement with one of the
downstream buyers. We discover in this context that exclusivity creates an additional instrument
which allows the seller easily to capture surplus generated by the vertical relationship.
10Since cL > V L
6 =2 , the allocation
¡
IL,IL¢
is no longer an exclusive equilibrium of the game.
11Notice that the creation of an exclusive-dealing relationship discourages entry, as in Aghion and Bolton (1987),
but in our model this is desirable.
7For simplicity, we continue supposing throughout this subsection that both the symmetric
allocation (IL,IL) and the asymmetric allocations (IH,0)/(0,IH) are nonexclusive Nash equilibria
of the game, but that only the asymmetric outcomes survive exclusivity.
In order to proceed, let us assume that the seller organises an English auction in which down-
stream ￿rms are allowed to publicly ￿bid￿ for the exclusive right over trade with him.12 Even
though one can of course imagine other ways in which the contract might be sold, the proposed
mechanism is a simple and natural formulation. In equilibrium, we must hence have that:
πe
1(IH,0) − cH − pe
1 = πe
2(0,IH) − cH − pe
2 =0
where pe
j is Dj￿s equilibrium bid. This condition simply says that the potentially exclusive buyers
bid exactly the expected net revenue of the protected ￿rm in the unique exclusive equilibrium
of the game, because otherwise one of the buyers could slightly increase his bid and thus get
the exclusive-dealing contract. By symmetry, we have that the equilibrium price of the exclusive
contract is given by pe(= pe
1 = pe
2)=πe
1(IH,0) − cH, and therefore the expected net revenue of
both the protected and unprotected ￿rm is zero. Let￿s assume, without loss of generality, that D1
gets the exclusive rights over trade with U.
Without further assumptions, it is diﬃcult to say when an exclusive regime will actually arise.









In words, this means that U will never consider entering into an exclusive trade agreement with
one of the buyers unless its expected payoﬀ when doing so is at least equal to its lowest payoﬀ
among the possible nonexclusive equilibria of the game. This is only a necessary condition for









Notice therefore that by selling an exclusive contract the upstream ￿rm is able to appropriate
the entire net surplus generated in the asymmetric exclusive equilibrium. It follows from this
property that whenever aggregate surplus is maximised at the allocation (IH,0), the seller will
choose to write an exclusive-dealing contract with one of the buyers and exclusivity will achieve
the ￿rst-best outcome. The converse is not true however. Since by signing an exclusive agreement
the seller is able to extract additional rents from the buyers, these distributional eﬀects make the
contract attractive even absent the eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects of exclusivity.13
3A m o r e g e n e r a l m o d e l
In this section we generalise the simple setup discussed before in order to study the eﬀects of
exclusivity when the investment function of downstream ￿r m si sc o n t i n u o u s .W ea l s oc o n s i d e ra
richer bargaining framework.
12Bernheim and Whinston (1998) consider related issues. In that paper, two manufacturers simultaneously bid
for representation by a retailer. There are no speci￿c investments in the model. Additionally, in their exclusive
equilibrium there are asymmetries between both manufacturers and the retailer ends up serving only the most
eﬃcient one. In our model, there is an exclusive equilibrium even though downstream ￿rms are ex ante symmetric.
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Figure 3: Relationship between downstream ￿rms￿ valuations
Each ￿nal consumer desires at most one unit of Dj￿s output and has an observable net valuation
of the good that is randomly related to the level of Dj￿s relation-speci￿c investment, according to






+ v(I2)+( 1− s) (8)
where Ij ∈ [0, ﬂ I], ﬂ I<+∞, is the (noncontractible) eﬀort level, v(•) is an increasing strictly concave
function, v
ﬂ
≥ 0 and s ∼ U[0,1] is a continuous random variable with probability density function
given by f(s). This formulation, which is a special case of Bolton and Whinston (1993), involves
perfect negative correlation between both downstream ￿rms￿ valuations (see Figure 3). Perhaps
D1 is an indoor restaurant and D2 an outdoor restaurant, and s is the weather. As in the example
of the previous section, investment by U is unproductive. Note in addition that Vj depends only
on Dj￿s investment choice; so, in this framework investments have no cross-eﬀects or spillovers.
The monetary equivalent cost of the eﬀort level exerted by Dj is given by the increasing strictly
convex function c(Ij). We further assume that c(0) = v(0) = 0 and 0 <c 0(0) <v 0(0).
In the absence of an exclusive-dealing contract, the sequence of events is that downstream ￿rms
make simultaneous observable but noncontractible investment choices, then the state of the world
is revealed and afterwards the three ￿rms bargain over whether D1 or D2 gets the input and the
price to be paid (see Figure 1). There are no liquidity constraints and all ￿rms are risk-neutral.
We adopt Segal and Whinston￿s (2000) (hereinafter SW) three-party bargaining solution. This
guarantees eﬃciency, so the highest-valuing buyer always receives the input. In addition, each
player captures ex post ap a y o ﬀ that is a linear function of that player￿s marginal contributions to
9the various possible coalitions of which he can be a member. One of the appealing features of their
cooperative model is that it encompasses as special cases both cooperative and noncooperative
bargaining solutions that have been previously used in the literature. Later on, we shall see that
in our setting this bargaining solution does give rise to some peculiar implications.
The possible coalitions Ω containing at least two players that can be formed in this game are
{U,D1}, {U,D2}, {D1,D 2} and {U,D1,D 2}. Let￿s simplify things by assuming that if the agents
do not reach an agreement on trade then each of them ends up with zero. Then, let ΠΩ de￿ne the
surplus that can be achieved ex post t h r o u g ha ne ﬃcient trade agreement among the members of
coalition Ω, noticing that ΠD1D2 =0because the buyers cannot produce unless U, the owner of
this input, is a member of a coalition. We denote by MΩ
j = ΠΩ∪j − ΠΩ,j∈ {U,D1,D 2}, agent
j0s marginal contribution to coalition Ω and, following the de￿nition in SW, we assume that agent
j0s bargaining payoﬀ is a nonnegatively weighted linear combination of his marginal contributions
MΩ
j to the diﬀerent coalitions that can potentially be formed.
Letting πj stand for agent j0s expected payoﬀ, and bearing in mind that ΠΩ = Πj =0for all
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D2 [ΠUD1D2 − ΠUD1]+αU
D2ΠUD2 (11)
for the upstream ￿rm, D1 and D2 respectively. The constants αΩ
j are the agent j0sw e i g h t i n g
parameters that determine his bargaining power. As mentioned above, the Shapley values used in









6. Since aggregate payoﬀss h o u l de q u a lΠUD1D2, the surplus generated by
the grand coalition of all agents, the parameters αΩ



















In order to calculate the surplus generated by every possible coalition that may be formed
in this game, we ￿rst de￿ne the states of the world in which D1 is the high-value buyer given
investments I1 ￿ I2. The probability of D1 being the high-value buyer is given by
ω =P r [ V1 ≥ V2]=P r[ v
ﬂ








[v(I2) − v(I1)+1 ]
￿
(13)
Hence, D1 will be the favoured buyer in those realisations of s that belong to the subset s1 = '
s : s ≥ 1
2 [v(I2) − v(I1)+1 ]
“
. Notice that this set might be empty. For notational convenience,
let us de￿ne ρ = v(I2)−v(I1)+1. Expression (13) and our de￿nition of the random variable s imply
that we need to consider three possible cases. First, when ρ ≤ 0 we have that ΠUD1D2 = ΠUD1
always, because V1 is greater than or equal to V2 in all possible states of the world. Secondly, when
ρ ≥ 2 we have instead that ΠUD1D2 = ΠUD2, because now V2 is greater than or equal to V1 in all
t h ep o s s i b l er e a l i s a t i o n s , that is, the subset s1 is empty. Finally, when 0 < ρ < 2,V 1 is greater
than or equal to V2 in some states of the world and V1 is smaller than V2 in others. More precisely,











we have ΠUD1D2 = ΠUD1.
The previous conditions, together with equations (7) and (8), allow us to write downstream

































































































D2 [v(I2) − v(I1)] otherwise (21)
Notice that these payoﬀs present a discontinuity at ρ =2and ρ =0respectively. As equations
(14) and (18)are clearly symmetric, we shall brie￿y explain how it was constructed for D1 only.






D2 is the highest-
valuing buyer (i.e., ΠUD1D2 = ΠUD2) and therefore, according to (10),D 1 only receives a share
αU
D1 of its own valuation in the bargaining process. In respect to the second term, we have that in




,D 1 is the high-value buyer (i.e.,







of V1 but also looses α
UD2
D1 V2
in the ex post bargaining. Similar arguments apply for D2￿s payoﬀ.
Given the ex ante symmetry of the buyers, it seems reasonable to make the following assump-






U ≥ 0, αU
D1 = αU
D2 = αU
D ≥ 0 and αD
U + αU
D > 0.
Assumption 1 thus implies that the seller￿s share of its marginal contribution when paired with
a downstream buyer is independent of the identity of the latter, and that downstream ￿rms￿ receive
similar shares of their respective marginal contributions when paired with U. Our assumption also
implies that α
UD2
D1 > 0 and α
UD1
D2 > 0. After introducing these restrictions into equation (12), we













U ≤ 1 (22)
Next, we use equations (14)-(21) to analyse Dj￿s ex ante investment incentives. We provide
them in detail only for D1 because the case of D2 i ss y m m e t r i ca n dw i l lt h e r e f o r eb eo m i t t e d .A t
11date 1, each risk-neutral buyer chooses his or her investment level to maximise expected pro￿ts,









[v(I1) − v(I2)+1 ]+2 αU
D
“







if ρ ≤ 0 (24)
v0(I1)αU
D if ρ ≥ 2 (25)
depending on the value of ρ = v(I2)−v(I1)+1. Assume that second-order conditions are satis￿ed.
Then we claim that, as in the example of the previous section, this more general investment
game can in general give rise to multiple Nash equilibria. To explain in the simplest setting why
this may happen we shall focus on pure-strategy equilibria.
First, we partition the space of feasible investments I1 ￿ I2 into two regions, which we call
B1 = {I1,I 2 : ρ ≤ 0}
B2 = {I1,I 2 : ρ ≥ 2}
Hence, region Bj,j=1 ,2, corresponds to the one where Dj is the high-value buyer in all the
possible realisations of s and therefore always ends up using the input. On the other hand, in
the space between regions B1 and B2 either ￿rm may receive the input in some nonempty subset
sj ⊂ s.
Using the payoﬀs derived above, i.e., equations 14-21, we then proceed to study D1￿s optimal
investment choice (a similar argument applies for D2). In Figures 4 and 5, bj(Ii) denotes buyer j￿s
best response function to investment level Ii. For example, inside regions B1 and B2,D 1￿s best





























respectively. Notice that these best response functions do not depend on I2. In addition, between

























where the superscript i stands for ￿interior￿. Since Assumption 1 implies that α
UD2
D1 > 0,I i
1(I2)
does depend on I2.
We can now start our characterisation of the possible Nash equilibria of this game. First, let Ii
denote the optimal investment choice of a downstream ￿rm in any interior equilibrium of the game
in which both buyers invest positive amounts. Using equation (26), we may conclude that this








− c0(Ii)=0 14, which implies that both
















Figure 4: Unique interior equilibrium in the absence of exclusive dealing
buyers expect to receive the input in the same number of states and that their expected pro￿ts are













Secondly, notice that in the space between regions B1 and B2, the best response function bj(Ii)
might present a discontinuity at some investment level ￿ Ii of Dj￿s rival (see Figures 4 and 5).15



















































































for D1 and D2 respectively. In other words, when D2 invests ￿ I2,D 1 is indiﬀerent between investing
Ii
1(￿ I2) and I
B2
1 because both investment levels generate similar pro￿ts given D2￿s strategy. Without
loss of generality, we shall assume that in this case D1 chooses Ii
1(￿ I2).
It should be clear from our previous discussion and Figures 4 and 5 that two equilibrium con￿g-
urations may typically arise in the case under consideration. In particular, the potential existence
of both interior and corner-type equilibria in this investment game will delicately depend upon
the relative locations of investment levels ￿ I and I
Bj
j .W h e n￿ I ≥ I
Bj
j , as in Figure 4, best response


















Figure 5: Multiple equilibria in the absence of exclusive dealing
functions don￿t cross inside regions Bj and therefore only an interior (symmetric) equilibrium Ei
may exist. However, when ￿ I<I
Bj
j , as in Figure 5, best response functions may in general cross
not only in the space between regions B1 and B2 but also inside those two regions, and the game
gives rise to an interior (symmetric) and two corner-type (asymmetric) equilibria. These three
possible equilibria are denoted by Ei and Ec
j,j=1 ,2, respectively in Figure 5.
The next proposition summarises our previous discussion, where w.l.o.g. we again focus on D1
only.
Proposition 1 (Existence of multiple Nash equilibria) Suppose that there exists at least one pure-


























































only an interior Nash equilibrium may exist in which both downstream ￿r m si n v e s ta tt h es a m e































































Figure 6: D1￿s optimal reply given I
B1
2 .
the game may have an interior (symmetric) and two corner-type (asymmetric) Nash equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that the ￿rst inequality holds. Then, by continuity of the best response
functions in the space between areas B1 and B2 a n du pt o￿ I, we have that ￿ I2 ≥ I
B2
2 and therefore
best response functions can cross only once. This crossing point determines a unique interior
(symmetric) Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when the second inequality holds we have
that ￿ I2 <I
B2
2 and, by similar arguments, best response functions may cross at most three times.
These three crossing points determine an interior (symmetric) and two corner-type (asymmetric)
equilibria of the game.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate more intuitively the buyers￿ optimal investment choices in a hypothet-
ical corner-type equilibrium Ec
1. In the former Figure we see that, given D2￿s equilibrium strategy,
D1 maximises pro￿ts investing I
B1
1 . Then, according to Figure 7, D2 is also adopting an optimal
reply. Given that D1 invests I
B1
1 ,D 2 maximises pro￿ts by investing exactly I
B1
2 .16 So, we conclude
that the potential multiplicity of equilibria already identi￿ed in the simple example of Section 2
carries over to this extended and richer formulation of the model.
3.1 First-best allocations
In this subsection we turn to the analysis of aggregate surplus with the aim of determining whether
the possible equilibria identi￿ed in the previous subsection can be ranked in terms of global eﬃ-
ciency. We therefore replicate the problem of a social planner that picks investment levels (I1,I 2)






Figure 7: D2￿s optimal reply given I
B1
1 .
















subject to Ij ≥ 0,j=1 ,2 (27)






















Assume that the Hessian matrix of second derivatives is negative de￿nite at the optimal invest-
ment choices. It is worth pointing out that the ￿rst terms on the left-hand sides of equations (28)
16and (29) give the gross marginal change in social welfare from a marginal change in Ij,j=1 ,2.
Clearly, if a global maximum occurs when both downstream buyers invest, then those two terms
are similar and equal the respective marginal costs, i.e., equalities hold in equations 28 and 29.
This situation characterises an interior (symmetric) ￿rst-best solution. However, a global maxi-
mum may also occur at a corner solution in which a single downstream ￿rm invests at a high level,
in which case one of the inequality constraints of equation (27) must be binding, that is, I∗
j > 0
and I∗
i =0 ,i , j=1 ,2,i6= j. Put diﬀerently, if for example net aggregate welfare is maximised
at investment choices I∗
1 > 0 and I∗
2 =0 , then equations (28) and (29) will at the optimum be
satis￿ed with strict inequality and equality respectively.
Summing up, aggregate welfare may be maximised at either interior or corner allocations, and
which particular solution arises depends upon the properties of the functions v(•) and c(•). So let
Ei,fb denote an interior solution, and E
c,fb
j stand for a corner ￿rst-best outcome in which only Dj

































for an interior and a corner solution respectively. Then, from the ￿rst-order conditions of these












j ) when I
fb
j > 0 and I
fb
i =0 ,j6= i (33)
Comparison of expressions (33) and (23)-(25) allows us to establish the following result.
Proposition 2 If aggregate surplus is maximised at a corner solution, a nonexclusive equilibrium
is suboptimal.
Proof. In the ￿rst-best allocation Ic,fb,D j invests I
c,fb
j > 0 and I
c,fb
i =0 .H o w e v e r , u s -







= c0(Ij) and v0(Ii)αU
D = c0(Ii),j ,i=1 ,2,j6= i. Then, taking into account (22)
and the properties of v(•) and c(•), in general Dj under-invests and Di over-invests with respect
to the ￿rst-best outcome. Obviously, in this context a nonexclusive interior equilibrium cannot
achieve the ￿rst-best outcome either.
This proposition is unsurprising. It says that in our setting private incentives to invest are
distorted in such a way that there are no feasible values of the bargaining parameters αD
U and
αU
D such that a ￿rst-best corner allocation is potentially achieved. Any nonexclusive interior
equilibrium is clearly ineﬃcient because both downstream ￿rms are active, i.e., both buyers invest
at ineﬃciently low levels. Regarding the corner-type equilibrium Ec
j, t h es o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciency in
this case is that Dj faces hold-up problems, whereas Di overinvests. Dj is the high-value buyer in
all possible realisations and captures ex post af r a c t i o nαD
U +2 αU
D ≤ 1 of the marginal increases
in Vj, but has to pay the full investment costs. So Dj undervalues its investments from a social
17point of view and ends up investing at less than the socially optimal level. Regarding Di, we have
that even though this buyer never receives the input in equilibrium and so the increases in Vi do
not generate surplus, its investment raises its ex post bargaining power and hence create positive
private returns. So, Di ineﬃciently overinvests. Notice that ineﬃciency is the result of two factors.
Exclusive-dealing contracts may in some cases eliminate one of these sources of ineﬃciency (namely,
Di￿s overinvestment), and hence exclusivity provisions achieve second-best equilibrium allocations
that Pareto dominate the alternative nonexclusive equilibria of the game.
Rather diﬀerent results apply when the ￿rst-best solution is interior. Now the counterintuitive
conclusion applies that both buyers might overinvest in equilibrium despite the presence of potential
hold-up problems. The reason for this peculiar result resembles that indicated above; in Segal and
Whinston￿s bargaining framework a downstream ￿rm may ineﬃciently receive positive returns to
its investments even when it is the low-value customer. This mechanism, which is be diﬃcult to
justify from a noncooperative perspective, distorts private incentives to invest and in certain cases
this extra boost might outweigh hold-up problems. If this is the case, then ￿rms may end up
investing at exactly the ￿rst-best levels or even overinvesting in equilibrium.




D < 1, in the interior equilibrium Ei both ￿rms suboptimally underinvest
(ii) if αD
U +3 αU
D =1 , in Ei both ￿r m si n v e s ta tt h e￿rst-best levels
(iii) if αD
U +3 αU
D > 1, in Ei both ￿rms suboptimally overinvest.









= c0(Ij),j=1 ,2. However, using (32) we know that in the
￿rst-best allocation the condition
v0(Ij)
2 = c0(Ij),j=1 ,2, holds The results identi￿ed in the
proposition then follow directly from the comparison of these two expressions.
Since our following results regarding the relevance of exclusivity for investment incentives do
not depend on any of the conditions identi￿ed in the last proposition, for convenience the rest of
the paper assumes that αD
U +3 αU
D < 1.
This concludes our study of the main features of this extended model. Having established the
benchmark nonexclusive and ￿rst-best solutions, in the next section we turn to the analysis of
the eﬀects of exclusivity on downstream ￿rms￿ investment incentives, and we also discuss some
implications for welfare analysis of exclusive-dealing contracts.
4T h e e ﬀects of exclusive-dealing contracts
This section establishes when an exclusive contract signed between U and one of the downstream
￿rms, D1 say, impacts on the level of noncontractible investments and on global eﬃciency. The set
up is that an exclusive-dealing contract can be signed that prohibits U from selling the input to a
￿rm other than D1 (see Figure 1). Put diﬀerently, D1 has now exclusive rights over trade with U.
We also suppose that this contract presents, however, some degree of incompleteness, in the sense
that it cannot specify ex ante a positive trade between U and D1 because the nature of this trade
is unveri￿able. Thus, and following the ￿incomplete contracts￿ literature [e.g., Hart and Moore
(1990), Hart (1995)], we assume that the terms of future trade cannot be speci￿ed in advance
18and so the only feasible clause that can be included in the contract is the exclusivity provision.
Although not always applicable, veri￿ability of trading partners is frequently possible.
We further assume that exclusivity can be renegotiated ex post if trade with the uncontracted
buyer is eﬃcient (see Figure 1). Thus, this bargaining process always results in eﬃcient trade. This
also seems a reasonable assumption, because in realisations in which the unprotected ￿rm is the
more eﬃcient buyer, renegotiation of the exclusive contract can generate extra surplus to be divided
between the three parties. Hence, we follow Segal and Whinston in supposing that exclusivity is
a purely contractual arrangement that has no eﬀect on technical productivities. Notice that the
existence of an exclusivity clause aﬀects nonetheless the disagreement point for renegotiation and
therefore the allocation of aggregate surplus among the agents.
Our analytical framework is therefore similar that in SW, although they focus instead on a
vertical structure in which there is a single buyer and two possible sellers. In their basic setup the
sellers make investments in cost reduction and the buyer writes the exclusive-dealing contract with
one of the suppliers. Clearly, our model can be easily modi￿ed to encompass their type of vertical
relationship as well.
When the seller writes an exclusive contract with D1 that prohibits the former from selling the
input to D2 (or, alternatively, the compensation that U should pay to D1 in case the seller wanted
to trade the input with the nonexclusive buyer is prohibitive; we will say more about stipulated
damages later on), the members of coalitions {U,D1}, {U,D2} and {U,D1,D 2} can agree upon
a positive trade level if and only if any particular coalition includes D1 as one of its members.
Hence, in the presence of exclusivity we have that ΠUD2 =0in equations (9) − (11).I n o t h e r
words, since D1 has exclusive rights over trade with U but that agent is not a member of coalition
Ω = {U,D2}, the seller and the unprotected buyer cannot trade with each other and therefore
they generate zero surplus together.














D2 [ΠUD1D2 − ΠUD1] (36)
We of course maintain the adding-up restrictions given in equation (22). Using equations
(7), (8), (35) and (36), we can write downstream ￿rms￿ payoﬀs in the presence of an exclusive
















































































if 0 < ρ < 2 (42)
=0 if ρ ≤ 0 (43)
= α
UD1
D2 [v(I2) − v(I1)] otherwise (44)
for D1 and D2 respectively. After comparing these expected payoﬀsw i t ht h o s eg i v e ni nt h e
previous section (equations 14 through 21), we may conclude that D1, the protected buyer, receives
a greater share of the aggregate surplus generated by the grand coalition of all members, whereas
D2 experiences a decrease in its expected payoﬀ;t h a ti s ,πe
1 > π1 and πe
2 < π2. Not surprisingly,
the exclusive trade agreement enhances D1￿s bargaining power, because now U cannot trade the
input with D2 unless the protected buyer is compensated for giving away his exclusive right. But
exclusivity also hurts the nonexclusive buyer.
Regarding downstream ￿rms￿ investment incentives, we know that their decisions are to choose
investment levels to maximise πe
j − c(Ij),j∈ {D1,D 2}. For the case of D1,w e￿nd out that the
￿rst-order conditions of this problem are identical to those arising in the absence of an exclusive-
dealing contract. So, in this model the contracted buyer￿s marginal investment incentives are not
altered at all by the existence of exclusivity, that is, be
1(I2)=b1(I2).T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tD1




D1 V2f(s)ds when he writes an exclusive contract with
U and this expression doesn￿t depend whatsoever upon I1. The intuition is that nothing changes
in any coalition of which the exclusive buyer is already a member, whereas the additional payoﬀ
this buyer receives due to exclusivity doesn￿t depend on D1￿s investment because of the assumed
absence of cross-eﬀects. Additionally, notice that since α
UD2
D1 ≥ αD
U the contracted buyer receives
an additional expected transfer that is at least equal to the decrease in the seller￿s payoﬀ.A sw e
discussed in Section 2, this distributional eﬀect of exclusivity can be pro￿tably oﬀset by the seller
in the ex ante negotiations that determine which buyer obtains the access privilege.
Investment incentives in the presence of an exclusive contract may however be rather diﬀerent








ρ if 0 < ρ < 2 (45)
0 if ρ ≤ 0 (46)
v0(I2)(αD
U + αU
D) if ρ ≥ 2 (47)
In this case, be
2(I1) may diﬀer from b2(I1) and therefore the presence of an exclusive-dealing
contract will in general change the equilibrium investment levels of both downstream ￿rms. The
route is that the uncontracted buyer now has zero marginal incentives to invest in the coalition in
which he is matched with the seller, because recall that now ΠUD2 =0 . T h ed e c r e a s ei nD2￿s invest-
ment induces the contracted ￿rm to expand. Hence, the uncontracted ￿rm￿s best response function
may shift in the presence of exclusivity whereas the contracted ￿rm moves along its unchanged
reaction curve.
For notational convenience, let I
i,e
j denote buyer j￿s equilibrium investment choice in an exclusive
interior equilibrium Ei,e of the game. Similarly, let I
Bi,e
j ,i ,j=1 ,2, denote buyer j￿s equilibrium
investment level in an exclusive corner-type equilibrium E
c,e
j . Then, we can state the following
20general result regarding the equilibrium investment choices of downstream buyers in the presence
of an exclusive-dealing contract, which we label ￿The relevance result￿.
Proposition 4 (The relevance result)I fαU




Therefore, in this case both downstream ￿rms￿ equilibrium investment levels are aﬀected by the
presence of an exclusive-dealing contract.
Proof. We know from the arguments given in the text that D1￿s best response function is not
altered whatsoever when this ￿rm writes an exclusive contract with U. In respect to D2, we can
conveniently re-write equation (41) as
πe





which implies that, as long as αU
D > 0, the nonexclusive buyer￿s marginal investment incentives
are aﬀected under an exclusive regime and therefore the equilibria of this game diﬀer from those
identi￿ed under a nonexclusive regime.
This result stands in contrast to Propositions 1 and 2 of SW, which establish the main con-
clusions of that paper regarding the irrelevance of exclusivity for investment incentives. Recall
that SW claim that in their setup exclusivity only matters when speci￿c investments exhibit cross-
eﬀects and in addition the parties￿ payoﬀs are responsive to ￿external￿ value, namely, α
{UDi}/j
j > 0.
Within our framework, Dj￿s investment does not aﬀect either Di￿s valuation of the input or the
surplus U derives from trading this input with the other downstream buyer. In other words, buyer
j￿s investment has no impact whatsoever on the value of coalition {U,Di} and therefore, using
SW￿s terminology, in this model investments have no eﬀects on external value, e.g., we abstract
from cross-eﬀects. Nevertheless, we ￿nd to the contrary of SW that when both buyers make speci￿c
investments exclusivity is relevant for marginal investment incentives whenever the parties￿ payoﬀs
are just responsive to internal value; that is, whenever a buyer receives in the ex post bargaining
a positive share of its valuation even in realisations in which it is the low-value customer (i.e.,
αU
D > 0).
It is useful to further point out how this result relates to the simple model discussed in Section
2 of SW. In that example, the external ￿rm receives no surplus at all in the bargaining process
because it is part of a competitive industry. This in fact means that, according to our terminology,
the unprotected ￿rm￿s payoﬀ is not responsive to internal value and therefore it￿s not surprising
that in this context exclusive contracts don￿t have any eﬀects on investment incentives. But
recall that in our example of Section 2, where both buyers had investment opportunities and
the parties￿ payoﬀs were responsive to internal value, we discovered that exclusivity did matter
for investment incentives. Hence, Proposition 4 generalises our previous ￿ndings to the case of
continuous stochastic eﬀects and noncontractible investments.
Exclusivity matters whenever downstream ￿rms￿ payoﬀs are responsive to internal value (e.g.,
αU
D > 0)b e c a u s ei ta ﬀects D2￿s marginal incentives to invest in the coalition in which this ￿rm is
matched with the seller only, and therefore exclusive dealing impacts on the equilibrium investment
choices of both buyers. In addition, our analysis suggests that exclusivity might in fact be irrelevant
for investment incentives even when downstream ￿rms￿ payoﬀs are responsive to ￿both internal and
external￿ values, that is, α
UDi
Dj > 0. It seems relevant then to separate the concept of responsiveness
to ￿strictly internal￿ value from the idea of responsiveness to ￿both internal and external￿ values,
21because within our framework these two concepts have very diﬀerent implications in terms of the
relevance of exclusivity for investment incentives. The next de￿nition formalises our terminology.
De￿nition.D o w n s t r e a m￿rms￿ payoﬀs are responsive to strictly internal value if αU
D > 0. In
addition, downstream ￿rms￿ payoﬀsa r er e s p o n s i v et oboth internal and external values if α
UDi
Dj > 0.
According to equation (22), in this setting payoﬀs are responsive to both internal and external
values. Notice, in addition, that responsiveness to strictly internal value is a suﬃcient but not
necessary condition for the existence of responsiveness to both internal and external values.
We shall assume from now on that the buyers￿ payoﬀsa r er e s p o n s i v et ostrictly internal value.
Our next proposition shows that in this context any exclusive interior equilibrium outcome is now
asymmetric and therefore socially ineﬃcient.

























exclusive interior equilibria can never achieve ￿rst-best solutions.
Proof. F r o mt h ec o m p a r i s o no fe q u a t i o n s(45) and (23) we can directly deduce that, as long
as αU
D > 0, the condition Ii
2 >I
i,e




1 . Since Ii
1 = Ii





The next subsection analyses further implications of exclusivity on aggregate surplus in the
context of corner ￿rst-best solutions. We show there that an exclusive regime may, under some
conditions, be eﬃciency-improving and hence increase aggregate surplus.
4.1 Exclusivity as a surplus-enhancing device
In this subsection we look in particular at the eﬃciency levels of nonexclusive and exclusive corner-
type equilibria. In order to address these additional features of our model it is convenient to focus
the discussion on situations in which ￿rst-best outcomes occur at corner solutions. This assumption
makes sense, because it is precisely under these circumstances that exclusivity enables more eﬃcient
allocations to potentially emerge and is also more valuable for the seller. In this context, exclusivity
provisions can be seen as contractual devices that might drive vertical relationships towards second-
best and hence eﬃciency-improving allocations.
For simplicity, we shall also assume throughout this subsection that a corner-type equilibrium
outcome achieves a higher level of eﬃciency than an interior allocation under a nonexclusive regime;
put diﬀerently, we suppose that a corner-type allocation, if it exists at all, is the most eﬃcient
allocation in the absence of exclusivity.
More explicitly,
Proposition 6 Suppose that aggregate surplus is maximised at a corner solution. Then, the exclu-
sive corner-type equilibrium E
c,e
1 achieves a second-best allocation and is therefore socially preferred






















Figure 8: Welfare-improving equilibrium outcome in the presence of exclusive dealing
Proof. We know that at the optimal solution E
c,fb
1 , the conditions v0(I
c,fb





2 =0hold. From Proposition 2 we have that in the nonexclusive corner-type equilibrium
Ec







1 whilst D2 invests zero (see equation 46). Hence, the exclusive corner-type
equilibrium E
c,e
1 must represent a net gain and therefore achieves a second-best allocation.
This proposition says that when exclusivity matters for investment incentives and a ￿rst-best
outcome occurs at a corner solution, in which a single buyer invests at a relatively high level, there
might exist potential eﬃciency gains derived from moving from any nonexclusive equilibrium to an
exclusive corner-type equilibrium outcome. In particular, exclusive dealing may be valuable from
a social perspective because it exhibits the desirable property of eliminating less eﬃcient equilibria
in which too many ￿rms invest too little. Therefore, exclusive corner-type equilibrium outcomes
may actually achieve second-best allocations, and moreover exclusive regimes may be more eﬃcient
than the benchmark nonexclusive solutions even though they potentially result in complete vertical
foreclosure of the unprotected buyer.
We illustrate this result in Figure 8. It is relatively straightforward to construct numerical
examples in which only the corner-type equilibrium E
c,e
1 exists after U writes an exclusive-dealing
contract with D1.T h a t ￿gure illustrates a plausible situation in which an interior (Ei)a n da
corner-type equilibrium (Ec
1) exist in the nonexclusive benchmark. The ￿rst-best allocation is
given however by the corner solution Ec,fb in which a single buyer, D1 say, invests. According
to our previous assumption, we have that Ec
1 is nevertheless more eﬃcient that Ei. According to
our last proposition, if only the corner-type equilibrium E
c,e
1 survives exclusivity, then exclusive
dealing represents an unambiguous Pareto improvement. This conclusion provides some positive
social roles for emerge of exclusive trade agreements and may in principle explain as well the
23pervasiveness of exclusive-dealing contracts in a world of incomplete contracts.
4.2 Finite stipulated damages for breach of contract
U pt on o ww eh a v ea n a l y s e dt h ee ﬀects on investment incentives of exclusive contracts that com-
pletely block any potential trade between U and D2. In this ￿nal subsection we relax this assump-
tion, and brie￿y discuss whether our previous results change when the exclusive-dealing contract
only includes a clause that speci￿es a ￿nite penalty that U must pay to D1 in case the former sells
the input to D2. Notice that we don￿t need to relax any of our previous informational assumptions
in order to deal with this situation. This enquiry allows us to conclude that full exclusivity actu-
ally arises as a special case of this more general formulation, and so the case of ￿nite stipulated
damages combines analytical features already explored in previous sections of this paper.
To begin with, suppose that V2 is greater than or equal to a certain stipulated damage P for all
possible investment levels and realisations, e.g., v
ﬂ
≥ P. Under these circumstances, we have that
ΠUD2 = V2−P ≥ 0 and therefore exclusivity, even though it still has distributional eﬀects, doesn￿t
have any impact on the buyers￿ marginal investment incentives. To show this, we focus on D2￿s




































Notice that the expression in braces is exactly similar to that given in equation (18). Thus it
is immediate that liquidated damages cannot have any impact on marginal incentives.
Matters change when V2 may potentially be smaller than P in some nonempty subset of states
of nature, because the penalty that U has to pay to D1 for breach of contract in realisations in
which D2 is the high value buyer is so high that if it must be paid it precludes any potential trade
between U and and the nonexclusive buyer. This was in fact the situation discussed in previous
sections of the paper. The subset of states of the world in which V2 ≤ P is given by
sp = {s : s ≥ v
ﬂ
− P + v(I2)+1 }
Notice that ΠUD2 =0whenever s ∈ sp. After de￿ning s∗ =v
ﬂ
−P +v(I2)+1, we may write the
buyers￿ payoﬀs in the presence of an exclusive-dealing contract between U and D1 that includes





































D2 (V2 − V1)f(s)ds (49)
When s∗ ≤ 0 for all I2, equations (48) and (49) collapse to expressions (37) and (41) respectively
and therefore a full exclusive relationship emerges as a special case of this formulation. Since s∗
doesn￿t depend upon I1, equations (48) and (49) con￿rm our previous ￿nding that exclusivity has
no eﬀect whatsoever on D1￿s marginal investment incentives, whereas it impacts negatively on D2￿s
24marginal incentives. In addition, when s∗ ≥ 1 for all I2, downstream ￿rms￿ marginal incentives
coincide with those given in equations (23)-(25). Hence, the inclusion of stipulated damages for
breach of contract in the model con￿rms our previous ￿ndings regarding the eﬀects of exclusivity
provisions on the equilibrium investment levels of both buyers.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Exclusive-dealing contracts encourage relationship-speci￿c investments by allowing ex post hold
up by the investing party. This reasoning appears to be straightforward, but the literature has
struggled to make the story cohere. There are several reasons. First, the focus has been on the
marginal return to investment. In some cases these are unaﬀected by exclusive contracts, but this
is not enough to conclude that investment is unaﬀected. Exclusivity nearly always boosts total
returns and this makes all the diﬀerence when, as is often true, there are investment indivisibilities.
Next, existing models of exclusive dealing assume cooperative bargaining over the division of
the surplus follows non-cooperative investment decisions. Cooperative bargaining has the property
t h a t ,e v e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fa ne x c l u s i v ec o n t r a c t ,a￿rm that does not trade shares in the surplus
created by those that do. An exclusive contract eliminates the surplus otherwise created by a
coalition of the seller and the uncontracted buyer but if neither has investment opportunities
the contracted buyer￿s marginal investment incentive is unchanged. The implication is that the
investment equilibrium in the absence of exclusivity remains so in its presence. This is the basis for
Segal and Whinston￿s irrelevance of exclusivity result. The case of both buyers having investment
opportunities is though entirely reasonable and Segal and Whinston do not examine the desirability
of exclusive dealing in this case. In an otherwise similar set up to theirs, we show that multiple
equilibria are intrinsic in this situation. Buyer investments are strategic substitutes and are also
substitutes as far as the creation of aggregate surplus is concerned. It is therefore possible that
both buyers invest at a low level but it would be more eﬃcient if only one ￿rm invests at a high
level. Exclusive dealing enables this bene￿cial rationalisation to emerge. The route is not that
the contracted ￿rm￿s marginal return to investment is enhanced (nothing changes in any coalition
of which it is a member). Rather the unprotected buyer now has zero marginal incentive to
invest in the coalition in which it is matched with the seller. The uncontracted ￿rm￿s publicly
observed lower investment incentive causes the contracted ￿rm to expand which may be enough
to altogether eliminate the uncontracted ￿rm￿s investment incentive. The only equilibrium that
may survive exclusivity is the asymmetric non exclusive outcome. Not only may this be more
eﬃcient but the exclusive contract creates an instrument which allows the seller easily to capture
the surplus.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) are far more positive than Segal and Whinston concerning the prof-
itability of exclusive dealing. They too assume cooperative bargaining but assume that exclusivity
prevents the excluded ￿rm having access to information vital in creating productive investment.
So a non-exclusive relationship with two or more ￿rms investing is transformed by an exclusive
contract into one in which, without further analysis, only one ￿rm need be considered. When
the ￿rm￿s investments are perfect substitutes it is clearly eﬃcient that only one should invest,
as is guaranteed by exclusive dealing. The desirability of exclusivity is thus guaranteed if there
is an equilibrium in which in its absence both buyers invest. Wasteful replication is eliminated
by exclusivity and, since surplus is only shared amongst two rather than three parties, the under
investment due to hold up is reduced. Under non exclusivity and perfect substitutes Rajan and
Zingales show that there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium so their case is made.
Our non cooperative analysis does in a way mirror this story but instead of assuming that an
25exclusive contract makes it technically impossible for the excluded ￿rm to invest, we show that the
contract makes it economically unpro￿table to do so. Also our model is somewhat richer, so the
symmetric non exclusive equilibrium is pure strategy. This part of our analysis combines elements
of Rajan and Zingales and Segal and Whinston to make the case for the pro￿tability of exclusive
dealing.
Whether exclusivity precludes trade with uncontracted parties may sometimes be a choice
variable. Suppose the possibility of developing a use for an input depends on early disclosure of
its characteristics by the supplier. One strategy is to make this information freely available to all
potential users. This is our analysis with no contract in place. Another possibility is to disclose the
information to all but also grant one ￿rm an exclusive contract to buy the input. This preserves
some incentive for rivals to develop products using the input, because they have opportunity to
negotiate for it with the protected ￿rm. Finally, the supplier could only inform a chosen ￿rm; in
eﬀect vertical integration. These arrangements are ordered by the incentives for rivals to invest
versus the encouragement given to reap economies of investment scale. For example, the middle
arrangement may be best if one ￿rm investing heavily to exploit a particular application of the
input is likely to be the best way of exploiting it, but there is also the possibility that other
￿rms could at low cost come up with a radical idea that is much more valuable. So our analysis
provides the basis for a theory of joint ventures as a possibly intermediate step between full vertical
integration and nonintegration with a downstream industry.
Cooperative bargaining solutions are best justi￿ed as incorporating notions of justice. This is
not obviously a basis for positive economics. In particular, ￿rms that fail to trade do not in reality
usually receive compensatory payments from those that do. Reasonable noncooperative bargaining
models do not have this feature and this fundamentally changes the nature of the results. Segal
and Whinston brie￿y look at a noncooperative game that embodies the outside-option principle.
Drawing an analogy with Chiu (1998) and de Meza and Lockwood (1998) they conclude that
exclusivity diminishes the investment incentive of the protected ￿rm. A simple example in the
Appendix challenges this argument. The key is that an exclusive contract provides the protected
￿rm with a return even when it is not the high-value buyer (this would not be true in the absence
of exclusivity). The threat to buy and use the good itself is more potent the greater is its value to
the buyer. Thus the marginal investment return to the contracted ￿rm is greater under exclusivity.
This may, as before, precipitate an asymmetric equilibrium though the direct cause is the stimulus
to the protected ￿rm rather than the investment deterrent to the uncontracted ￿rm. Moreover
the creation of a positive marginal return when the contracted ￿rm is the low-value buyer may
partially oﬀset the underinvestment due to holdup in the asymmetric case.
The overall message is that the case that exclusivity promotes relationship-speci￿ci n v e s t m e n t
is much more robust than earlier analyses suggested. That brings the theory much closer to the
evidence.
26APPENDIX
An alternative noncooperative story. The basic set up is similar to that discussed in
the text. We are interested here in providing some very preliminary intuitions of an alternative
noncooperative ￿solution￿ in which exclusivity might still matter for investment incentives in a
world of incomplete contracts. The three-player bargaining protocol that we are going to apply
here is an appealing extension of Rubinstein (1982) introduced in Bolton and Whinston (1993).
There are two downstream ￿rms, H and L, that value the input at 12 an 10 respectively. The seller
has zero valuation. In negotiating with H, the upstream ￿rm has an outside option of selling the
input to L at his reservation price (for the latter can never displace the highest-valuing buyer).
Since 10 > 12
2 , this outside option is binding and therefore Bolton and Whinston claim that the
input will be sold to H for a price of 10. This seems indeed a very reasonable outcome.
Now suppose that the seller has entered into an enforceable exclusive trade agreement with L,
that is, L can block the direct sale of the input to H. This means that the upstream ￿rm looses
its outside option. A plausible story in this case would be that the seller and L bargain over the





. In the subsequent bilateral bargaining
between L and H, the former agent has an outside option of using the input internally, so the input
is in the end transferred to H at a price of 10. Hence, ￿nal payoﬀsa r e5 for the seller, 5 for L and 2
for H. Of course, this ￿nal outcome might be achieved instead in a single step bargain, with L paid
5 to relinquish its exclusive right and H pays 10 for the input. Notice therefore that when there is
an exclusive-dealing contract L, the low-value buyer, receives a positive payoﬀ that directly depends
upon his valuation and therefore exclusivity will in general aﬀect his investment incentives.I nf a c t ,
this non cooperative bargaining approach seems to extend reasonably to ￿nite breach penalties as
well. Therefore, exclusivity may still be relevant for investment incentives even in the context of
noncooperative three-player bargaining frameworks.
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